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PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SOURCES AND METHODS, THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF

DCID NO. 1/14, DATED 23 JUNE 1967

#### 1. BACKGROUND

- A. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THE PERSONNEL SECURITY

  CRITERIA FOR ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE

  WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY PFIAB ITSELF IN ITS STUDY OF THE

  DUNLAP CASE IN 1964 AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE USIB SECURITY

  COMMITTEE FOR ACTION.
- B. THE DISCOVERY IN 1965 OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY OF SGT.

  ROBERT L. JOHNSON, ESPECIALLY WHILE HE WAS ASSIGNED

  TO THE ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE (ARFCOS) SERVED

  TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD.
- C. AFTER CONSIDERABLE INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AS WELL AS CONSULTATION WITH OTHER USIB COMMITTEES (SIGINT COMOR) THE DCID WAS ISSUED IN 1967.

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#### 2. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

- A. THE DCID ESTABLISHES UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY

  APPROVAL CRITERIA INCLUDING THE SCOPE OF THE

  INVESTIGATION, FOR ACCESS TO ALL THE COMMUNITY'S

  COMPARTMENTED COLLECTION SYSTEMS (EXCEPT

  RESTRICTED DATA WHICH HAS STATUTORY CONTROL).
- B. THESE SYSTEMS REPRESENT OUR MOST SENSITIVE, MOST PRODUCTIVE AND MOST EXPENSIVE COLLECTION EFFORTS.
- C. THE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH THESE CLEARANCES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS STAGGERING:

SI: 25X1A 25X1A

TKH AND APPROXIMATELY

25X1A

## 3. IMPACT OF DCID 1/14 ON THE COMMUNITY

- A. ESTABLISHES. FOR THE FIRST TIME, COMMON PERSONNEL SECURITY CRITERIA AND UNIFORM INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SYSTEMS.
- B. WILL FACILITATE SECURITY CERTIFICATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
- C. STRESSES THAT A SECURITY APPROVAL MUST BE A COMMON SENSE DETERMINATION BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

- D. CONTINGENT UPON "NEED-TO-KNOW," A PERSON CLEARED
  FOR ONE SYSTEM CAN NOW EASILY BE PROCESSED FOR
  ACCESS TO ANOTHER SYSTEM, SINCE THE STANDARDS ARE
  UNIFORM.
- E. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A PERIODIC (5-YEAR) RE-INVESTI-GATION IS A VALUABLE CI TOOL.
- F. AS A SIDE EFFECT, THE USIB APPROVED RECOMMENDATION
  THAT ALL PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO ARFCOS MEET DCID
  1/14 STANDARDS, WILL BOTH UP-GRADE ARFCOS SECURITY
  AND AT THE SAME TIME, PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR
  THE COMMUNITY'S INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS CARRIED
  THROUGH ARFCOS CHANNELS.

### 4. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

- A. WITH DCID 1/14 ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT, WE MAY EXPECT SOME PROGRESS TOWARD UNIFORMITY IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
  - 1) THE PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT (PHS):

    A WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED

    TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING
    A COMMON PHS FOR THE COMMUNITY.

- 2) PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS (MONEY IS

  A PERENNIAL PROBLEM IN THIS FIELD, BUT

  A START HAS BEEN MADE IN THE ACCEPTANCE

  OF A COMMON FORMAT FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY

  SURVEYS).
- COLLECTION METHODS, AND THE ACADEMIC

  BACKGROUND OF THOSE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE

  INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INVOLVED IN THESE

  PROGRAMS, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR

  ARTICLES, SPEECHES AND PARTICIPATION IN

  SEMINARS ARE MOST IMPORTANT. TO ATTAIN

  MORE UNIFORMITY IN THIS FIELD, A WORKING

  GROUP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE

  SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES OF MEMBER AGENCIES

  TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY.
- 5. A SECURITY PROBLEM: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
  - A. THE ERVIN BILL (S-1035)

A BILL TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT:

- (1) TO ENJOY THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
- (2) TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENTAL INVASION OF PRIVACY

#### B. STATUS

PASSED BY SENATE ON 13 SEPTEMBER 1967 BY AN OVER-WHELMING MAJORITY. INTRODUCED INTO THE HOUSE AND NOW IN COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE.

### C. SALIENT POINTS IN BRIEF - PROHIBITIONS

- (1) TO DISCLOSE RACE, RELIGION OR NATIONAL ORIGIN
  OR THAT OF FOREBEARS. (INQUIRY CAN BE MADE
  WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY OR ADVISABLE TO
  DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR ASSIGNMENT RELATED
  TO NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN OR OUTSIDE U.S.).
- (2) TO MAKE ANY REPORT CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES

  OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS SUCH ARE RELATED TO

  PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES. (DOES NOT

  PRECLUDE IF THERE IS BELIEF OF OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

  OR EMPLOYMENT IS IN CONFLICT WITH OFFICIAL

  DUTIES).

- (3) TO SUBMIT TO INTERROGATION (WHERE INVESTIGATION IS FOR MISCONDUCT) WHICH COULD LEAD TO
  DISCIPLINARY ACTION WITHOUT PRESENCE OF
  COUNSEL OR PERSON OF CHOICE, IF REQUESTED.
- (4) TO DISCLOSE ANY ITEMS OF PROPERTY, INCOME,
  ETC. OR THOSE OF ANY MEMBER OF FAMILY UNLESS
  CONFLICT OF INTEREST IS INVOLVED.
- (5) TO SUBMIT TO ANY INTERROGATION OR EXAMINATION
  OR TAKE ANY PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST DESIGNED TO
  ELICIT INFORMATION (WITH ANY PERSON CONNECTED
  BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OR
  PRACTICES, ATTITUDE OR CONDUCT RE SEXUAL
  MATTERS). DOES NOT PRECLUDE SPECIFIC SEXUAL
  MISCONDUCT CHARGES MADE AGAINST THAT PERSON
  FOR WHICH AN OPPORTUNITY IS AFFORDED TO REFUTE
  CHARGE.
- (6) TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST IN APPLYING FOR EMPLOYMENT DESIGNED TO ELICIT INFO AS GIVEN ABOVE.

(7) TO REQUIRE PARTICIPATION IN ANY ACTIVITIES

OR UNDERTAKINGS UNLESS RELATED TO OFFICIAL
DUTIES.

## D. IMPACT OF BILL ON SENSITIVE AGENCIES

- (1) LIMITS QUESTIONS INVOLVING NATIONAL ORIGIN OF APPLICANT, PARENTS, SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY MARRIAGE, BLOOD OR ADOPTION. ESSENTIAL IN PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
- VERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS, FRONT ORGANIZATIONS,

  PRIVATE FOREIGN TRAVEL, UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS IN

  U. S. WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USSR, ITS

  SATELLITES, OR COUNTRIES UNDER COMMUNIST

  CONTROL.
- (3) PRECLUDES PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS FOR SENSITIVE ASSIGNMENTS AND RELATED MATTERS.
- (4) PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AS AN AID TO INVESTIGATIONS.
- (5) LIMITS THE USE OF AN EFFECTIVE PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT.

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- (6) ADVERSE EFFECT ON FIELD INVESTIGATIONS.
- (7) SOME LIMITATIONS ON INTERROGATIONS FOR MIS-CONDUCT WHICH MAY INVOLVE NATIONAL SECURITY.

#### E. EXCEPTIONS

FBI, CIA AND NSA - DOES NOT PRECLUDE THESE
AGENCIES FROM REQUESTING AN EMPLOYEE OR APPLICANT
TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH TEST OR A PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST
WHEN SUCH TEST OR INFORMATION IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT
THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

OTHER MEMBERS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOT EXCEPTED. THEY RECEIVE THE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM CIA.

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